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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the plight of small businesses in New York 
City has become a contentious topic. Although the city and its 
current mayoral administration share a long-standing commit- 
ment to affordable housing,1 the city’s small businesses—an 
integral and defining feature of the urban landscape—have suf- 
fered immensely. In the past decade, local  establishments 
have largely given way to a homogenous landscape of empty 
storefronts and national chain stores.2 The loss of local busi- 
ness occurs with such staggering frequency that there is an 
entire thriving blog subculture documenting their “vanishing”3 
and the Center for an Urban Future publishes an annual re- 
port on the growth of chain businesses in the city.4 Pro-devel- 
opment   advocates   assert   that   this   “vanishing” merely 
 
1 It is worth noting that the success of this commitment is open to debate. 
Compare William Neuman, De Blasio Says City Will Hit Affordable-Housing Goal 2 
Years Early, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/ 
nyregion/de-blasio-affordable-housing-goal-2-years-early.html [https:// 
perma.cc/K8V3-L2LG] (reporting that the de Blasio administration would meet its 
goal of creating or preserving 200,000 units of affordable housing by 2024 two 
years early, in 2022), with J. David Goodman, De Blasio Expands Affordable 
Housing, but Results Aren’t Always Visible, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/nyregion/de-blasio-affordable-housing-new- 
york-city.html [http://perma.cc/JE49-3BRU] (explaining that many beneficiaries 
of the Mayor’s affordable housing plan are angry with the extensive rezoning the 
city promoted to build new housing, and do not feel that their apartments are 
indeed “affordable,” despite qualifying as such under the Mayor’s plan). Even if 
the apartments are adequately affordable for residents, the demand for them 
vastly overshadows the supply. Cf. Goodman (noting that the city held lotteries 
for approximately 5,000 apartments in 2017, but that tens of thousands of re- 
sidents apply for such apartments). 
2     See  Christian  Gonza´ lez-Rivera,  Ctr.  for  an  Urban  Future,  STATE  OF  THE 
CHAINS (2017) [hereinafter STATE OF THE CHAINS], https://nycfuture.org/pdf/ 
CUF_StateOfChains_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/RA5L-WA96]. 
3 See, e.g., JEREMIAH’S VANISHING N.Y.C., http://vanishingnewyork.blogspot. 
com/  [http://perma.cc/FXG2-39QR]  (extensively  documenting  and lamenting 
the disappearance of small businesses in New York). Jeremiah Moss, the owner of 
the blog, recently published a book on the same topic, which The New York Times 
describes as “chronicl[ing] how (and why) a city of diners and delis morphed into a 
string of interchangeable blocks filled with forgettable stores of the sort that could 
be found in a Long Island strip mall.” Ronda Kaysen, A Book from a Blogger About 
Disappearing New York, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/08/11/realestate/a-book-from-a-blogger-about-disappearing-new- 
york.html [http://perma.cc/V7T5-S2YB]; see also EV GRIEVE, http://ev- 
grieve.com/ [http://perma.cc/QZ7F-MHJ2] (local news blog from Manhattan’s 
East Village documenting, among other events, the closure of small businesses). 
See STATE OF THE CHAINS, supra note 2. 
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represents a sort of creative destruction that the city naturally 
experiences.5 However, critics point out that most of these 
businesses were perfectly viable—even thriving—but were 
pushed out by a local commercial law regime that favors large 
landlords and strips small commercial tenants of all bargaining 
power.6 This imbalance, they suggest, is what results in com- 
mercial rents that can increase close to ten-fold when it comes 
time to renew leases.7 
In response to this perceived injustice, small business ad- 
vocates have proposed the Small Business Jobs Survival Act 
(SBJSA) in the New York City Council.8 The Act proposes vari- 
ous protective measures and seeks to increase small commer- 
cial tenant bargaining power.9 However, the bill’s current 
incarnation languished at the committee stage until October 
2018, when it finally received its first hearing.10 A primary 
reason for the near decade-long inability of the bill to make it to 
hearings—and the current uncertainty as to whether it will 
make it to a vote—in City Council is the position, held by some 
council members and real-estate advocates, that the proposed 
 
5 See Brad Hoylman, Our Community Cannot Afford the Cost of ‘High-Rent 
Blight,’ CHELSEA NOW (July 5, 2017), http://chelseanow.com/2017/07/our-com 
munity-cannot-afford-the-cost-of-high-rent-blight/ [http://perma.cc/FZG9- 
QJ9U]. 
6 See Max Rivlin-Nadler, Law that Would Help NYC from Being Strangled by 
Chain Stores Is Deserted by City Council, VILLAGE VOICE (Sept. 30, 2016), https:// 
www.villagevoice.com/2016/09/30/law-that-would-help-nyc-from-being-stran 
gled-by-chain-stores-is-deserted-by-city-council/ [http://perma.cc/D2U2- 
K5AX]. 
7 See, e.g., Steven Kurutz, Bleecker Street’s Swerve from Luxe Shops to Va- 
cant Stores, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/ 
fashion/bleecker-street-shopping-empty-storefronts.html?mcubz=1 [http:// 
perma.cc/XD8U-D9T5] (noting that, in 2008, rent for a unit on Bleecker Street 
skyrocketed from $7,000 per month to $45,000 per month as soon as the tenant’s 
lease expired). 
8 See SBJSA, TAKE BACK NYC (2015), http://takebacknyc.nyc/sbjsa/ 
[https://perma.cc/XG58-FB7B]. 
9 See Small Bus. Cong., The Small Business Jobs Survival Act, SAVE NYC 
JOBS, https://www.savenycjobs.com/jobs-survival-act [http://perma.cc/KVH8- 
SSRA] (proposing legislation to empower small businesses in the city and combat 
their decline). 
10 See Jenny Dubnau, Why New York Needs Commercial Rent Control, METRO- 
POLITAN COUNCIL ON HOUSING (Sept. 2015), http://metcouncilonhousing.org/news_ 
and_issues/tenant_newspaper/2015/september/why_new_york_needs_commer 
cial_rent_control [http://perma.cc/A97B-LMAQ]; see also Tanay Warerkar, City 
Council Debates Small-Biz Bill at Heated Hearing, CURBED NY (Oct. 23, 2018, 9:11 
AM), https://ny.curbed.com/2018/10/23/18013348/small-business-jobs-sur- 
vival-act-mom-pop-nyc-council [https://perma.cc/5RXS-RFA7]. It is worth not- 
ing that various versions of the SBJSA have been floating around City Council 
since the 1980s. Needless to say, no version of the bill made it to the floor of City 
Council for a vote, despite what is at times widespread support. See infra Part III. 
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legislation is unconstitutional.11 However, public debate on  
the bill and related measures has reemerged in the recent may- 
oral election and its aftermath.12 
This Note surveys the current status of small businesses 
and commercial tenant law in New York City and discusses 
whether or not the SBJSA and commercial rent control are 
constitutional in light of current regulatory takings jurispru- 
dence. Part I surveys the history of land use regulations in the 
city, the introduction of residential rent control, and the city’s 
brief flirtation with commercial rent control in the mid-20th 
century. Part II explains the decline and current state of small 
businesses and the commercial law regime in the city, includ- 
ing the SBJSA proposal. Part III describes the origins and cur- 
rent state of regulatory takings law in light of the Supreme 
Court’s 2017 decision in Murr v. Wisconsin. Part IV evaluates 
whether the SBJSA is constitutional in light of that recent tak- 
ings jurisprudence. Finally, this Note concludes that the 
SBJSA would constitute a regulatory taking when it comes to 
commercial spaces that are free-standing or under separate 
ownership from the residential units above them in mixed-use 
structures. However, when a commercial space in a mixed-use 
building is under the same ownership as the residential units 
in that building, then the SBJSA would not constitute a regula- 
tory taking. This appears to be a paradoxical result, but it is 
one that is nonetheless grounded in current regulatory takings 
law. Ultimately, the possibility of the municipal government 
having to provide compensation to even some commercial land- 
lords for regulatory takings would likely render the SBJSA im- 
practicable and prohibitively costly. Therefore, this Note 
recommends that City Council and small-business advocates 
seek other avenues to curb the decimation of small business in 
 
11 Cf. Abigail Savitch-Lew, Trepidation Around Proposal for Regulating Store 
Rents in NYC, CITYLIMITS.ORG (June 13, 2016), https://citylimits.org/2016/06/13 
/trepidation-around-proposal-for-regulating-store-rents-in-nyc/ [http:// 
perma.cc/6RAL-3HKJ] (quoting a local real estate advocate, John Banks, as refer- 
ring to the SBJSA as unconstitutional). 
12 See, e.g., David Cruz, Fiery Debate for 14th Council District Seat Addresses 
Past and Present, NORWOOD NEWS (Aug. 28, 2017), http://www.norwoodnews.org/ 
id=24139&story=fiery-debate-for-14th-council-district-seat-addresses-past-and- 
present/ [http://perma.cc/5MMD-EYW2] (documenting a heated debate over the 
SBJSA between candidates for a City Council district in the Bronx in the lead-up 
to the 2017 municipal elections); see also, e.g., Ed Litvak, (Voter Guide) Mary 
Silver – City Council District 2, LO-DOWN (Sept. 5, 2017, 7:54 AM), http:// 
www.thelodownny.com/leslog/2017/09/voter-guide-mary-silver-city-council- 
district-2.html [http://perma.cc/FN3H-KCWQ] (explaining the pro-SBJSA posi- 
tion of a candidate for the City Council district encompassing Murray Hill in 
Manhattan). 
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the city. This conclusion has implications far beyond New York 
City, affecting any municipality that wishes to introduce com- 
mercial rent regulation. 
 
I 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. History of Land Use Regulations in New York City 
The earliest years of New York City were defined by dense, 
mixed-use residential development below Wall Street. How- 
ever, beyond the small community on the southern tip of Man- 
hattan, most of the island was sprawling, meandering farm 
land with no apparent order.13 Manhattan and its surrounding 
locales, today’s boroughs, mostly remained this way until the 
introduction of the Commissioner’s Plan of 1811. The plan 
imposed the grid system upon the entire island, opening path- 
ways to development and presaging the city’s colossal growth 
in the coming century.14 Indeed, in 1810, a year before the 
Commissioner’s Plan was enacted, the city’s population was 
96,373.15 By 1920, following decades of heavy immigration,  
the city’s population was 5,620,048.16 Naturally, the previ- 
ously bucolic farmland north of Wall Street gave way to large- 
scale development to accommodate the teeming masses of the 
new metropolis. But despite the guiding hand of the grid sys- 
tem, the new development was unruly. The absence of a com- 
prehensive zoning scheme resulted in crowded, smoggy 
neighborhoods comprising residential, commercial, and indus- 
trial developments in close proximity to one another.17 Fur- 
ther,  as  buildings  were  able  to  grow  ever-higher  with  the 
 
13 See Jessica Dailey, When Wall Street Was a Wall: A 1660 Map of Manhat- 
tan, CURBED N.Y. (May 6, 2013, 11:50 AM), https://ny.curbed.com/2013/5/6/ 
10246784/when-wall-street-was-a-wall-a-1660-map-of-manhattan [http:// 
perma.cc/5Y6D-U8ZX]. 
14 See Artis Q. Wright, Designing the City of New York: The Commissioners’  
Plan of 1811, N.Y.C PUBLIC LIBR. (July 30, 2010), https://www.nypl.org/blog/ 
2010/07/30/designing-city-new-york-commissioners-plan-1811 [http:// 
perma.cc/M8X7-Y847]. 
15 N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning, Total and Foreign-Born Population: New York 
City, 1790–2000, CITY OF N.Y. https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download 
/pdf/data-maps/nyc-population/historical-population/1790-2000_nyc_total_ 
foreign_birth.pdf [http://perma.cc/WD5S-VEDV]. 
16 Id. 
17 See, e.g., Kelly Richman-Abdou, Jacob Riis: The Photographer Who Showed 
“How the Other Half Lives” in 1890s NYC, MASHABLE (May 21, 2017), https:// 
mymodernmet.com/jacob-riis-how-the-other-half-lives/ [https://perma.cc/ 
R53Z-2SCB] (describing and showcasing the work of Jacob Riis, pioneering 
photojournalist and muckraker whose work documented the squalor of Manhat- 
tan’s Lower East Side in the 1890s). 
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introduction of the steel-frame building and skyscraper, many 
streets became drowned in darkness.18 
It was in response to these concerns that the nation’s first 
comprehensive municipal zoning code was created: New York’s 
1916 Zoning Resolution.19 The 1916 resolution regulated the 
height and size of new construction and established a separa- 
tion of residential and industrial areas.20 As zoning caught on 
nationally, it faced numerous legal challenges; however, the 
Supreme Court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of zon- 
ing regulations in Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty  Co.21 
 
B. Modern Era 
In the years after Euclid, the city and New York State began 
to experiment with more expansive regulation of real estate. In 
fact, the city had a commercial rent control law that was en- 
acted by the state in 1945 in response to wartime pressures.22 
As a recent article on the debate over commercial rent control 
explains: 
In 1945, responding to the wartime emergency that had 
spurred skyrocketing rents and eviction rates, the New York 
State legislature enacted a law that limited when a commer- 
cial tenant could be evicted and instituted restrictions on 
rent increases. Landlords could not raise rents by more than 
15 percent above 1943 or 1944 rent levels if it would lead to a 
profit of more than 8 percent. The law was challenged re- 
peatedly in the courts, and ultimately the legislature allowed 
it to expire in 1963.23 
 
18 See Lisa Santoro, The Equitable Building and the Birth of NYC Zoning Law, 
CURBED N.Y. (Mar. 15, 2013, 12:37 PM), https://ny.curbed.com/2013/3/15/ 
10263912/the-equitable-building-and-the-birth-of-nyc-zoning-law [http:// 
perma.cc/5THU-65KD] (describing the construction of the massive Equitable 
Building in Lower Manhattan). The design and construction of the steel-frame 
structure was entirely unregulated and, at the time of completion, it was the 
largest office building in the world; the public backlash against the structure was 
a major impetus in introducing the nation’s first comprehensive zoning plan in 
New York. Id. 
19 See id.; N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, Zoning Background, CITY OF N.Y. 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/zoning/background.page [http://perma. 
cc/Y4KM-JZHJ]. 
20 Bd. of Estimate and Apportionment, 1916 Building Zone Resolution, CITY OF 
N.Y. (last updated Mar. 2004), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/down 
load/pdf/about/city-planning-history/zr1916.pdf [http://perma.cc/7TKD- 
S54R]. 
21 See 272 U.S. 365, 395, 397 (1926) (holding that zoning ordinances are 
constitutional exercises of state police power as long as they bear a rational 
relation to the health, safety, and general welfare of the community). 
22 See Dubnau, supra note 10. 
23 Savitch-Lew, supra note 11. 
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Thus the concept of commercial rent control is not entirely 
foreign to New York City. The debate on commercial rent con- 
trol was rekindled in the 1980s, when early forms of the SBJSA 
emerged; however, it was not until recently, when the survival 
of its small businesses was in serious jeopardy, that the city 
revisited the idea of commercial rent regulation in  earnest.24 
 
II 
THE DECLINE OF SMALL BUSINESS AND THE SEARCH FOR 
AN EXPLANATION 
A. Vanishing Mom and Pop 
In an editorial published on November 19, 2017, the edito- 
rial board of The New York Times pointed to the “scourge of 
store closings that afflicts one section of the city after an- 
other.”25 Something strange appears to be happening in New 
York: a metropolis that was once a city of neighborhoods, each 
containing “shops that met most residents’ basic needs, from 
groceries to shoes, from newspapers to haircuts,” appears to be 
vanishing.26 Some commentators seem to suggest that the city 
changes by nature and people are merely getting frustrated 
with what they see as the old New York vanishing to yield to the 
new.27 Yet the facts are indisputable: New York City’s small 
businesses have been disappearing with staggering 
frequency.28 
 
24 Although the SBJSA’s current incarnation, see infra Part III, was the first 
modern, comprehensive plan introduced in City Council to protect small business 
through a form of commercial rent regulation, the topic has been debated in city 
politics for quite some time. See, e.g., Pro & Con: Should the City Have Commercial 
Rent Control?; Croissants, Cobblers, and Free-Market Forces, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 
1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/07/07/weekinreview/pro-con-should- 
city-have-commercial-rent-control-croissants-cobblers-free-market.html?page 
wanted=all&mcubz=1 [http://perma.cc/B2MR-75AK] (describing a 1980s, Koch- 
era debate on commercial rent control and pointing to problems facing small 
businesses, such as “[w]hen the rent on a store triples,” that are only different 
from today’s problems in degree). For a more in-depth discussion of the problems 
facing small businesses in the 2010s, see infra Part II. 
25 Editorial, Why Is New York Full of Empty  Stores?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/19/opinion/nyc-empty-stores.html 
[http://perma.cc/A25T-ZRSD]. 
26 Id. 
27 See, e.g., Justin Davidson, Which New York is Yours? A Fierce Preserva- 
tionist and a Pro-Development Blogger Debate, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (May 1, 
2015), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/05/new-york-landmarks- 
law-debate.html [https://perma.cc/FAB2-ZLFJ] (debate between preservationist 
Jeremiah Moss of Jeremiah’s Vanishing New York and popular pro-development 
blogger Nikolai Fedak of New York YIMBY (Yes in My Back  Yard)). 
28  Cf., e.g., Tatiana Schlossberg, Bodegas Declining in Manhattan as Rents  
Rise  and  Chains  Grow, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2015),  https://www.nytimes.com/ 
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The decline in small business has coincided with a massive 
increase in the amount of commercial storefront vacancies29 
and the amount of chain stores in the city. The Center for an 
Urban Future’s 2017 State of the Chains report shows that the 
city (all five boroughs) had 7,317 national chains in 2017, an 
increase of 1.8% from the prior year and the ninth consecutive 
year of net increases in national chain stores throughout the 
city.30 Brooklyn, which has been experiencing rapid gentrifica- 
tion, saw a 3.1% increase, the largest increase in any of the five 
boroughs. As of December 2017, Dunkin’ Donuts was the na- 
tional retailer with the most locations in New York City, main- 
taining 612 stores.31 In short, the number of chain stores in 
New York is growing at an alarming rate. Given that these 
stores are renting predominantly in pre-existing retail space 
(rather than in new construction), it means that the spaces 
they occupy were once home to smaller, long-standing local 
businesses.32 
Interestingly, it is not only small businesses in lower-in- 
come parts of the city that are hurting; the “vanishing” phe- 
nomenon is prevalent in many of the city’s ritzier locales, even 
going so far as to affect some of the larger chains that might 
 
 
 
 
2015/08/04/nyregion/bodegas-declining-in-manhattan-as-rents-rise-and- 
chains-grow.html?_r=2 [http://perma.cc/AR7N-GK2B] (documenting the decline 
in bodegas in the city). 
29 See Vacant N.Y.C., http://map.vacantnewyork.com/ [http://perma.cc/ 
L39Y-VX27] (interactive map documenting the vacant storefronts throughout the 
city). 
30 STATE OF THE CHAINS, supra note 2. 
31 Id. (noting that this is also the ninth year Dunkin’ Donuts topped the list of 
chains in New York City with the most locations). As of 2017, the chains with the 
most growth in New York City were food-related, with retailers in that category 
comprising 41% of New York City’s growth in national chain locations in the last 
decade. It is worth noting that some cities, such as San Francisco, have recog- 
nized and attempted to curb the growth of chains that harm local businesses by 
enacting restrictions on “formula businesses.” See generally Mark Bobrowski, The 
Regulation of Formula Businesses and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 44 
URB. LAW. 227, 233–240 (2012) (providing background on the emergence and 
purposes of restrictions on formula businesses). 
32 Indeed, in its review of the book Vanishing New York: How a Great City Lost 
Its Soul, the book form of the blog discussed infra subpart III.B, The New York 
Times distills Jeremiah Moss’s essential claim to be that, “New York, in its current 
. . . form, is at ease with a disturbingly paradoxical identity, as a place that says 
yes to every branch of Dunkin’ Donuts and no to the people whose fortunes 
consign them to working there.” See Ginia Bellafante, Tracking the Hyper-Gentrifi- 
cation of New York, One Lost Knish Place at a Time, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/books/review/vanishing-new-york-jer- 
emiah-moss.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/UD8Y-JGTH]. 
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have initially wrought the change.33 Bleecker Street in the 
West Village, whose western section was one of Manhattan’s 
most coveted commercial strips, tells a representative tale. On 
the few western blocks of Bleecker Street, 44 long-standing, 
small neighborhood businesses have closed since 2001.34 
Bleecker Street was one of the most famous retail streets in 
Manhattan, renowned for its small, whimsical, and creative 
shops.35 As the neighborhood began to gentrify, it became a 
luxury shopping district where the once-creative shops were 
replaced by high-fashion designer stores “selling $400 T- 
shirts.”36 As Steven Kurutz explains in his article in the Times 
about Bleecker’s story: 
During its incarnation as a fashion theme park, Bleecker 
Street hosted no fewer than six Marc Jacobs boutiques on a 
four-block stretch, including a women’s store, a men’s store 
and a Little Marc for high-end children’s clothing. Ralph 
Lauren operated three stores in this leafy, charming area, 
and Coach had stores at 370 and 372-374 Bleecker. Joining 
those brands, at various points, were Comptoir des Coton- 
niers (345 Bleecker Street), Brooks Brothers Black Fleece 
(351), MM6 by Maison Margiela (363), Juicy Couture (368), 
Mulberry (387) and Lulu Guinness (394). . . . Today, every 
one of those clothing and accessories shops is  closed.37 
He further remarks: 
In the heart of the former shoppers’ paradise—the five-block 
stretch running from Christopher Street to Bank Street— 
more than a dozen retail spaces sit empty. Where textured- 
leather totes and cashmere scarves once beckoned to pass- 
ers-by, the windows are now covered with brown construc- 
tion paper, with “For Lease” signs and directives to “Please 
visit us at our other  locations.”38 
 
33 See STATE OF THE CHAINS, supra note 2; see also Kurutz, supra note 7 
(documenting the decline of small business in the West Village, an upscale neigh- 
borhood in downtown Manhattan). 
34 BRAD HOYLMAN, BLEAKER ON BLEECKER: A SNAPSHOT OF HIGH-RENT BLIGHT IN 
GREENWICH VILLAGE AND CHELSEA, https://www.nysenate.gov/sites/default/files/ 
press-release/attachment/bleaker_on_bleecker_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/F58T- 
9AU8] (NY State Senate report documenting the causes and rampancy of small 
business decline and empty storefronts in downtown Manhattan). 
35 See Kurutz, supra note 7 (explaining that Bleecker was once home to many 
unique small stores, including “antiques stores . . . a pet store called the Bird 
Jungle; the Biography Bookshop; and Nusraty Afghan Imports, where an immi- 
grant named Abdul Nusraty had been selling rugs, jewelry and antiquities since 
1979”). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
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As this phenomenon became noticeable throughout the en- 
tire city, people began to ask what was happening—and how it 
could be fixed. 
 
B. Reasons for the Decline of Small Business 
In looking for explanations for the marked decline in small 
business in the city, it is common to hear that the retail land- 
scape is simply changing due to online shopping and that these 
businesses are no longer viable.39 However, what is surprising 
about many of the closures is that the shuttered businesses 
were, in fact, thriving and beloved local institutions—places 
that anchored their communities. The fact that many of these 
businesses were financially viable suggests that there must be 
a different cause for the decline of small business in the city 
other than the changing retail landscape.40 
And, indeed, there is another cause: exorbitant rent in- 
creases when it comes time for businesses to renew their leases 
have played a leading role in the decline of small business in 
New York.41 As State Senator Brad Hoylman, who represents 
the district comprising Manhattan’s Chelsea neighborhood, 
explains, 
A trend has emerged: landlords, in the pursuit of higher and 
more reliable rents, don’t renew the lease of longtime busi- 
nesses. They then keep the space vacant, holding out for the 
payout of a long-term lease from [a] luxury retail or corporate 
chain, which can take months, or even years.  The result is a 
glut of empty storefronts or chain stores and high-end na-  
tional retailers, to the detriment of local small  businesses.42 
Thus it is not uncommon to see landlords increase rents 
ten-fold on otherwise healthy businesses that are simply una- 
ble to withstand the increase.43   Jeremiah Moss has     fastidi- 
 
39 See Why Is New York Full of Empty Stores?, supra note 25 (“On one level, 
there’s just so much the city can do. Online shopping is here to stay, and it takes 
an inevitable toll on brick-and-mortar stores.”). 
40 For a seminal discussion of the importance of small business in urban 
communities, see generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN 
CITIES (1961). 
41 See Edward Helmore, New York’s Vanishing Shops and Storefronts: ‘It’s Not 
Amazon, It’s Rent,’ GUARDIAN (Dec. 24, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian. 
com/business/2017/dec/24/new-york-retail-shops-amazon-rent [http:// 
perma.cc/M6RW-36BR]; see also Why Is New York Full of Empty Stores?, supra 
note 25. 
42 Hoylman, supra note 5. 
43     See, e.g., Luis Ferre´ -Sadurnı´, Sunshine Cinema, a Beloved Manhattan The- 
ater, Goes Dark, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/ 
21/nyregion/sunshine-movie-theater-closing.html?smid=TW-nytmetro&smtyp= 
cur [http://perma.cc/PJX9-BQGL] (providing a recent example of the closure of a 
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ously documented the death of beloved local businesses in his 
popular blog, Jeremiah’s Vanishing New York.44 In his decade 
of maintaining the blog, Moss has documented the closure of 
thousands of small businesses in New York City, many of 
which had large and dedicated clienteles but suffered exorbi- 
tant rent hikes.45  As Tim Wu noted in The New  Yorker: 
In the West Village, rent spikes are nearly universally re- 
ported as the reason so many storefronts have closed over the 
past few years. Cafe Angelique reportedly closed when its 
sixteen-thousand-dollar rent increased to forty-two thou- 
sand dollars. A Gray’s Papaya [a long-standing local hot dog 
mini-chain] on Eighth Street closed after its owner reported a 
rent increase of twenty thousand dollars per  month.46 
Some are beginning to characterize this phenomenon of 
rampant vacancy as “high-rent blight.”47  In other words, pros- 
 
popular and financially healthy independent movie theater in Manhattan’s Lower 
East Side). The theater was forced to close after its building was sold to a new 
developer who planned to raise the rent well beyond its previous $8,000 per 
month rate at the end of its lease; the theater could easily make its previous rent, 
but not the increased price.  Id. 
44 See JEREMIAH’S VANISHING N.Y.C., supra note 3. 
45 Particularly noteworthy is Moss’s story of the “vanished” Cafe Edison in 
Manhattan’s Theater District. Cafe Edison was a beloved cafe popular with the 
show-business crowd. See Michael Schulman, An Activist For New York’s Mom- 
and-Pop Shops, NEW YORKER (June 26, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/mag- 
azine/2017/06/26/an-activist-for-new-yorks-mom-and-pop-shops [http:// 
perma.cc/X559-4EA8]. Moss broke the news that the beloved cafe would be 
forced to close when its landlord denied it a lease renewal after 34 years in the 
space. Jeremiah Moss, Cafe Edison, JEREMIAH’S VANISHING N.Y.C. (Nov. 6, 2014), 
http://vanishingnewyork.blogspot.com/2014/11/cafe-edison.html [http:// 
perma.cc/U6BD-QKNY]. In a remarkable effort to save the business and demon- 
strate that the cafe had sufficient support in the community to make its rent, 
Moss organized a lunch mob with some 600 people, which garnered the express 
support of Manhattan Borough President Gale Brewer, New York State Senator 
Brad Hoylman, and Manhattan District 3 Council Member Corey Johnson. The 
protests received global coverage on NPR and the BBC. The support was not 
enough to convince the landlord to renew the lease. See Jeremiah Moss, Cafe 
Edison is Closing, JEREMIAH’S VANISHING N.Y.C. (Dec. 16, 2014), http://vanish- 
ingnewyork.blogspot.com/2014/12/cafe-edison-is-closing.html [http:// 
perma.cc/K3LV-7NGW] (discussing Cafe Edison’s dedicated clientele); see also 
Tim Wu, Why Are There So Many Shuttered Storefronts in the West Village?, NEW 
YORKER (May 24, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/why- 
are-there-so-many-shuttered-storefronts-in-the-west-village [http://perma.cc/ 
XH66-G8FB] (discussing rent hikes). 
46 See Wu, supra note 45. 
47 See, e.g., id. (“Abandoned storefronts have long been a hallmark of eco- 
nomic depression and high crime rates, but the West Village doesn’t have either of 
those. Instead, what it has are extremely high commercial rents, which cause an 
effect that is not dissimilar. ‘High-rent blight’ happens when rising property val- 
ues, usually understood as a sign of prosperity, start to inflict damage on the city 
economics that Jane Jacobs wrote about.” (referencing Jane Jacobs, famed ur- 
banist and West Village denizen who wrote extensively in the 1960s on the small 
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perous districts of the city bear the physical hallmarks of 
“blight” not because they are impoverished, but rather because 
few, if any, businesses can afford the rent; these neighbor- 
hoods are victims of their own ostensible success in attracting 
astronomically high rents. In the words of the inimitable per- 
ennial candidate Jimmy McMillan: “The rent is too damn 
high.”48 
 
III 
BIRTH OF THE SMALL BUSINESS JOBS SURVIVAL ACT 
A. The Act 
As the situation for New York’s small businesses becomes 
increasingly dire, the question of what, if anything, should be 
done has become a contentious topic, garnering recognition 
from some of the city’s leadership.49 It was with this issue in 
mind that legislators introduced the SBJSA to City Council. 
The most noteworthy extant proposal to address the crisis of 
small businesses in the city, the Act “applies to independently 
owned and operated New York City businesses, with no   more 
 
businesses that made the neighborhood such a success)); see also, e.g., Ilya 
Marritz, There Seem to Be a Lot of Empty Storefronts, WNYC NEWS (Mar. 23, 2017), 
http://www.wnyc.org/story/there-seem-be-lot-empty-storefronts-problem/ 
[http://perma.cc/KQB8-ZNP5] (discussing high rent blight in the Manhattan’s 
East Village and more generally); Alanna Schubach, Storefront Map: Where Have 
NYC’s Retail Shops Gone?, BRICK UNDERGROUND (Mar. 24, 2017), https:// 
www.brickunderground.com/live/vacant-storefront-nyc [http://perma.cc/ 
KM5S-ULQE] (discussing, with the founder of Vacant New York, the website’s 
interactive map of empty storefronts and the concept of high-rent blight); Alissa 
Walker, Full Bank Accounts, Empty Storefronts: The Economics of High-Rent Blight, 
GIZMODO (May 26, 2015, 5:40 PM), https://gizmodo.com/full-bank-accounts- 
empty-storefronts-the-economics-of-1706993230 [http://perma.cc/BHB6-PN2X] 
(discussing high-rent blight). 
48 Christian Royer, Rent Is Too Damn High Party Debate, YOUTUBE (Oct. 18, 
2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kcsNbQRU5TI [https://perma.cc/ 
UKF8-8QND]. 
49 See, e.g., Sarina Trangle & Ivan Pereira, Council Speaker Melissa Mark- 
Viverito Releases Proposals to Bolster Retail Sector, AMNEWYORK (Dec. 14, 2017, 
12:01 AM), https://www.amny.com/real-estate/mark-viverito-retail-proposals- 
1.15444258 [http://perma.cc/68GE-GP3L] (discussing efforts by the exiting City 
Council speaker to combat the decimation of small business in the city). For an 
example of this contentiousness, one need only look to the public outrage over the 
proposed startup “Bodega,” which sought to “disrupt” the corner bodega business 
by placing around the city what are essentially glorified vending machines that 
allow customers to pay using their iPhones. Many members of the public found 
the name “Bodega” to be offensive in light of the precarious position of small 
businesses (particularly actual bodegas) in the city’s current commercial climate. 
See Emily Nonko, Bodega Owners Don’t Think New Yorkers Will Shop at a Vending 
Machine Called ‘Bodega,’ VILLAGE VOICE (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.vil 
lagevoice.com/2017/09/18/bodega-owners-dont-think-new-yorkers-will-shop- 
at-a-vending-machine-called-bodega/ [http://perma.cc/4RP8-US6J]. 
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than 100 employees, where such business is not dominant in 
its field.”50 Under the SBJSA, commercial tenants have a guar- 
anteed right of renewal of their 10-year leases, unless the ten- 
ant fails to pay rent in a timely manner or engages in another 
behavior in breach of contract with the landlord.51    Then: 
If the landlord agrees to renew the lease, he and the tenant 
can negotiate the rent or either party can compel non-binding 
mediation. If after 90 days of negotiations and/or mediation 
there is no agreement, the tenant must initiate arbitration in 
order to retain the right to renew. The arbitrator’s rent deter- 
mination is binding [unless the tenant refuses to pay that 
amount in rent] and based on considerations including, the 
rental market in the area, the condition of the space and 
services provided, the landlord’s maintenance costs, and the 
extent to which the business is bound to a particular 
location.52 
If the tenant does not agree to the rent determined by the 
arbitrator, then the tenant can remain in possession of the 
space at a rent no greater than a 10% increase than the average 
of the previous year’s rent.53 If a new prospective tenant ap- 
proaches the landlord with a bona fide offer, then the original 
tenant has the right of first refusal and can choose to sign a 
lease at the rate agreed between the landlord and the prospec- 
tive bona fide purchaser.54 In other words, the landlord cannot 
simply enlist a third party to make an above-market offer solely 
for the purpose of pushing out the original tenant. 
 
B. Legislative Attempts to Pass the SBJSA 
Although its current iteration is from 2009, the SBJSA has 
existed in one form or another in City Council since the 
1980s.55 Remarkably, no City Council speaker has ever per- 
mitted the Act to make it to the floor of City Council for a vote.56 
 
50 See Dina Botwinick et al., Saving Mom and Pop: Zoning and Legislating for 
Small and Local Business Retention, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 607, 628–29 (2010) (describ- 
ing the SBJSA but referring to it as the “Small Business  Act”). 
51 See Creating a Small Business Lease Program, LEGIS. RES.CTR., http:// 
legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1825175&GUID=AFE9C183- 
5929-43FB-80AE-C7595CB610BD [http://perma.cc/2GSV-GJQ3] (official ver- 
sion of the bill as introduced in City Council four years  ago). 
52 Botwinick et al., supra note 50, at 628–29 (footnotes omitted). 
53 See Creating a Small Business Lease Program, supra note 51 (SBJSA § 22- 
905(e)(3)(g) as introduced). 
54 See id. 
55 See Dennis Lynch, Oops, They Did It Again! Council Snubs S.B.J.S.A., 
VILLAGER (Oct. 6, 2006), http://thevillager.com/2016/10/06/oops-they-did-it- 
again-council-snubs-s-b-j-s-a/ [http://perma.cc/8GGG-TERF]. 
56 Id. 
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The first hearing on this 2009 iteration took place in October 
2018; however, at present, it is uncertain if it will make it to a 
floor vote, despite what appears to be widespread  support.57 
It is not entirely clear why a bill with widespread support 
cannot make it to the floor of City Council for a vote, or even 
why it took so long for a simple hearing. Opponents of the bill 
in City Council and on the Real Estate Board of New York, a 
real estate trade association, suggest that it is not within the 
power of government to impose controls over commercial prop- 
erty leases.58 Proponents of the bill, on the other hand, take 
the more cynical view that the City Council is beholden to 
powerful real estate interests in the city. As Max Rivlin-Nadler 
for The Village Voice argued: 
[City Council] won’t even allow the legislation to go before a 
committee hearing, even though 27 councilmembers support 
it. Why? In short, because it would supremely piss off the 
powerful real estate interests that all major politicians in New 
York City must answer to, which makes it a total nonstarter. 
Debating the Small Business Jobs Survival act would start a 
conversation about the future of the city that no ambitious 
politician actually wants to have.59 
It is for precisely this reason that “the [SBJSA] has become 
symbolic for its proponents of the Council’s inability—or un- 
willingness, depending [on] who you ask—to tackle the inequi- 
ties in commercial tenant-landlord relationships in this city.”60 
 
C. Renewed Calls for the SBJSA 
As pointed out in the prior section, the SBJSA has lan- 
guished since City Council legislators introduced its current 
iteration in 2009. However, as noted in Part II, the health and 
status of small businesses in the city have become considera- 
bly more precarious in the interim.61 
Recognition of this fact has led to renewed calls from vari- 
ous municipal leaders and activists for passage of the SBJSA. 
Debate over the dangers facing small businesses and the   ap- 
 
57 Id. (explaining that the current iteration has “27 sponsors, or one sponsor 
over the 26-vote halfway mark needed to pass it in the 51-member Council.”); see 
Warerkar, supra note 10 (documenting the October 2018 City Council hearings). 
58 Id. 
59 Rivlin-Nadler, supra note 6. This article was written before the October  
2018 hearing, but the essential point—that some believe City Council is beholden 
to real estate interests—remains the same. 
60 Lynch, supra note 55. 
61 See generally supra Part II (explaining the accelerated rate at which small 
businesses have been disappearing since the bill was introduced in 2009). 
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propriate solution to those dangers played a role in New York’s 
recent municipal elections.62 The result of the election has 
been the empowerment of a municipal government that claims 
it is progressive and finally granted a hearing on the SBJSA.63 
Whether it will ultimately vote on and pass the bill remains to 
be seen. 
Unsurprisingly, the possibility that the SBJSA will become 
a reality in City Council is still being met with considerable 
backlash, with many of the city’s real estate interests sug- 
gesting that the Act is not only undesirable but also possibly 
unconstitutional.64 One of the primary arguments against the 
SBJSA is that it is a regulatory taking in light of takings juris- 
prudence.65 Opponents believe that commercial rent regula- 
tions so dramatically diminish the value of a landlord’s 
property that their imposition constitutes a regulatory taking 
for which landlords must be compensated.66 The  following 
Parts of this Note examine doctrinal developments in regulatory 
takings law and their potential implications for the passage of 
the SBJSA. 
 
IV 
THE LAW OF TAKINGS 
A. Origin of Regulatory Takings Doctrine, the 
“Denominator Problem,” and Conceptual Severance 
The Fifth Amendment’s “Takings Clause” states that, “pri- 
vate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without   just 
 
62 See, e.g., Cruz, supra note 12 (documenting heated debate over SBJSA 
between City Council candidates in the Bronx); Marni Halasa, The City Council 
Must Vote on the S.B.J.S.A., VILLAGER (Oct. 19, 2017), http://thevillager.com/ 
2017/10/19/the-city-council-must-vote-on-the-s-b-j-s-a/ [http://perma.cc/ 
8APL-SYVV] (City Council District 3 candidate expressing support for the SBJSA); 
Litvak, supra note 12 (explaining pro-SBJSA position of a city council candidate 
from Murray Hill); Rich Bockmann, Majority of City Council Speaker Candidates 
Back Commercial Rent Control, REAL DEAL (Nov. 2, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://ther- 
ealdeal.com/2017/11/02/majority-of-city-council-speaker-candidates-back- 
commercial-rent-control/ [http://perma.cc/5DWA-HEXS] (noting that six out of 
eight candidates for Speaker of City Council supported some form of commercial 
rent control, including the ultimate victor, Corey Johnson). 
63  See, e.g., Warerkar, supra note 10; Editorial, ‘A New Progressive Era’ in  
New York City, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/ 
01/opinion/bill-de-blasio-inauguration.html [http://perma.cc/Z7CU-YMVD] (ex- 
plaining de Blasio’s commitment to “a new progressive era” in his inaugural 
speech, in which he was sworn in by Senator Bernie Sanders). At the inaugura- 
tion, the city’s reelected public advocate and comptroller spoke and “emphasiz[ed] 
their progressive credentials.”  Id. 
64 See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 55. 
65 See Savitch-Lew, supra note 11. 
66 See id. 
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compensation.”67 Beginning with the seminal case Penn- 
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon in 1922,68 regulatory takings doc- 
trine is the “idea that a regulation’s diminution of private 
property value can result in a taking” that falls under the Fifth 
Amendment’s prohibition and thus requires compensation 
from the government.69 
The controversy in Mahon involved a regulation in Penn- 
sylvania coal mining country that allowed the surface, support 
layer, and ore below the ground of an estate in land to be split 
among multiple owners. Some forty years prior to the litiga- 
tion, the defendant, Pennsylvania Coal Company, sold the sur- 
face rights to a parcel of land, retaining the rights to the 
support and ore beneath it in accordance with state law and 
waiving liability for any damage caused by the coal mining 
beneath the surface.70 Later, Pennsylvania passed the Kohler 
Act, making it illegal to engage in below-surface mining that 
could cause any structure above ground to sink. The Kohler 
Act thus destroyed any previously existing contract or property 
rights relating to the ore beneath the surface.71 The defendant 
coal company, faced with the lawsuit seeking to enjoin its min- 
ing, asserted that this regulation went beyond the mere inci- 
dental fluctuations of property values that are the inevitable 
result of government regulation; rather, the company argued, 
this regulation rose to the level of a taking for which the com- 
pany must be compensated if the regulation were to be consti- 
tutional.72 The Court ultimately held that the Kohler Act 
constituted a taking, insofar as it wholly destroyed the defen- 
dant’s property interest. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Holmes recognized that: 
The general rule at least is that while property may be regu- 
lated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking. . . . We are in danger of forgetting that 
a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not 
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than 
the constitutional way of paying for the  change.73 
 
67 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
68 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
69 See Hannah Jacobs, Searching for Balance in the Aftermath of the 2006 
Takings Initiatives, 116 YALE L.J. 1518, 1522 (2007). 
70 See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412; see also Laura J. Powell, The Parcel As A 
Whole: Defining the Relevant Parcel in Temporary Regulatory Takings Cases, 89 
WASH. L. REV. 151, 156 (2014) (surveying the history of regulatory takings 
doctrine). 
71 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412–13. 
72 See id. at 400–04. 
73 Id. at 415–16. 
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In short, Holmes and the majority of the Court held that, in 
cases involving regulatory takings, the presiding court should 
look to any diminution in value that is caused by the regulation 
in question.74 However, diminution in value must by nature be 
a diminution as a fraction of some entire value. What, pre- 
cisely, that entire value is became a critical issue whose resolu- 
tion would have a significant impact on the outcome of takings 
cases. 
Holmes and the majority evaluated diminution in value 
relative to the value of the property right in the ore.75 Taken 
from this perspective, the diminution in value was the total 
value of the ore, making this a clear case of when the regulation 
“goes too far” and “will be recognized as a taking.”76 The dis- 
sent, penned by Justice Brandeis, asserts that the diminution 
in value must take into account the value of the property as a 
whole: 
[V]alues are relative. If we are to consider the value of the 
coal kept in place by the restriction, we should compare it 
with the value of all other parts of the land. That is, with the 
value not of the coal alone, but with the value of the whole 
property. The rights of an owner as against the public are not 
increased by dividing the interests in his property into sur- 
face and subsoil. The sum of the rights in the parts can not 
be greater than the rights in the  whole.77 
The interpretive dispute between Holmes and Brandeis— 
that is, the question of what exactly is being diminished by the 
government regulation—has come to be known as the “denomi- 
nator problem.”78 “Conceptual severance” is the term given to 
Holmes’ notion that a parcel of land comprises parts and the 
diminution in value can be evaluated in relation to a “severed” 
part that is the target of the regulation in question. Brandeis, 
on the other hand, suggests that we must look at what has 
come to be known as the “parcel as a whole.”79 Of course, 
depending on how the “denominator” at issue is defined, the 
effect of the regulation can be enormous (and thus easily found 
to be a taking), or small (and thus unlikely to be considered a 
taking). 
 
74 See id. at 413, 415. 
75 See id. at 414–16. 
76 See id. 
77 Id. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
78 See Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test, 
118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 601, 622–24 (2014). 
79 See id. 
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B. The Rejection of Conceptual Severance 
The Court did not confront the denominator problem head- 
on until many decades later, with its landmark decision in 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.80 In Penn 
Central, the then-newly conceived New York City Landmarks 
Preservation Commission designated Grand Central Terminal 
as a landmark, preventing the owners of the terminal from 
constructing a 50-story modern office building on top of the 
historic station.81 Penn Central, the company that owned 
Grand Central, sued New York City, claiming that the 
landmark designation and concomitant restrictions on its 
property use constituted a taking of the company’s air rights 
for which it must be compensated.82 Thus, the applicable “de- 
nominator problem” in Penn Central was whether the diminu- 
tion in value should be viewed in relation to merely the air 
rights (i.e., conceptual severance), in which case it would be 
considerable diminution, or in relation to the air rights in addi- 
tion to the historic structure and rail operations (i.e., parcel as 
a whole), in which case the diminution would be less severe.83 
Ultimately, the Court rejected the conceptual severance doc- 
trine.  Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan held: 
“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into 
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights 
in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In de- 
ciding whether a particular governmental action has effected 
a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of 
the action and on the nature and extent of the interference 
with rights in the parcel as a whole ............ 84 
The Court continued, pointing out that although takings 
inquiries are “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,”85 there are 
nonetheless several factors that are particularly important, 
namely: 
 
80 Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). As an aside, 
Penn Central shows us that New York City’s regulation of its built landscape has 
long implicated and influenced takings law. 
81 Id. at 115–17. 
82 Id. at 119. 
83 Penn Central argued that, if the Court would conceptually sever its air  
rights above the property, the restriction on its use of air rights above Grand 
Central constituted a complete diminution in value. However, the Court pointed 
out that the air rights could still be sold to neighboring buildings, albeit at a much 
lower profit than could be realized if Grand Central itself could use them. See id. 
at 136–37. 
84 Id. at 130–31. 
85 Id. at 124. 
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The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, 
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered 
with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, 
relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the gov- 
ernmental action [important]. A “taking” may more readily be 
found when the interference with the property can be charac- 
terized as a physical invasion by government . . . than when 
interference arises from some public program adjusting the 
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the com- 
mon good.86 
Thus, in Penn Central, the Court expressly rejected the notion 
of conceptual severance espoused by Justice Holmes in the 
Mahon decision. 
In a case decided in the years following Penn Central, the 
Court added some more nuance to takings doctrine, distin- 
guishing between physical and nonphysical government inva- 
sions. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,87 the 
Court held that when the character of a government action is a 
permanent physical occupation of property, the Court will find 
that a taking has occurred, regardless of whether the invasion 
serves an important public benefit or has only minimal eco- 
nomic impact on the owner.88 It is worth noting, however, that 
there can be physical invasions that are not necessarily perma- 
nent and are thus not subject to the per se taking rule. Such 
regulations fall instead under Penn Central’s ad hoc balancing 
test.89 
 
C. The Murr Decision 
In its 2016 term, the Court made another foray into regula- 
tory takings law in the case Murr v. Wisconsin,90 elaborating on 
the rule articulated in Penn Central. This recent decision set 
forth a new test for determining what the “denominator” is in 
takings analysis. 
Murr involved siblings who inherited adjacent lots in a 
scenic area along the St. Croix River in Wisconsin.91 Under 
Wisconsin law, individual lots could not be used for separate 
building sites unless they had at least one acre of land suitable 
 
86 Id. (citations omitted). 
87 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
88 See id.  at 426, 434–35, 438 (holding that a nondescript but permanent  
wire installation on plaintiff-landlord’s apartment building in New York consti- 
tuted a taking). 
89 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124–25. 
90 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017). 
91 Id. at 1940. 
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for development.92 Further, adjacent lots under common own- 
ership could not be sold or developed as separate lots if they 
did not meet the requirement of having at least one acre of land 
suitable for development.93 The Murrs sought to build a cabin 
on one of the lots and sell the other lot to fund the construction 
of the cabin.94 However, because neither of the lots contained 
more than an acre of land suitable for development, the local 
rule prohibited them from selling or developing either parcel 
individually, effectively merging them into one parcel.95 The 
Murrs brought suit against the State of Wisconsin, alleging 
that this functional merger diminished the value of their prop- 
erty and thus constituted a regulatory taking.96 The case even- 
tually made its way to the Supreme Court on a denominator- 
problem issue—namely, whether the diminution in value 
should be viewed as a portion of one of the Murrs’ lots or 
both.97 If the denominator was only one of the lots, then the 
diminution would be quite large and would most likely consti- 
tute a regulatory taking.98 However, if the denominator were 
both the lots taken as one merged lot, then the diminution in 
value would be less severe and less likely to constitute a 
taking.99 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy pointed out that, 
“[a] central dynamic of the Court’s regulatory taking jurispru- 
dence . . . is its flexibility.”100 Because of this flexibility, “the 
Court has declined to limit the parcel in an artificial manner to 
the portion of property targeted by the challenged regula- 
tion.”101   Kennedy further noted: 
[Another] concept about which the Court has expressed cau- 
tion is the view that property rights under the Takings Clause 
should be coextensive with those under state law. Although 
property interests have their foundations in state law, . . . 
States do not have the unfettered authority to “shape and 
define property rights and reasonable investment-backed ex- 
 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 1941. 
95 Id. 
96 See id. 
97 See id. at 1943–44. 
98 See id. at 1941–42. 
99 Id. The trial court analyzed the diminution in value out of the two lots 
combined and found that the diminution was thus not sizable enough to consti- 
tute a taking. Id. at 1941. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the trial 
court properly focused on the Murrs’ “property as a whole.”  Id. 
100 Id. at 1943. 
101 Id. at 1944. 
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pectations,” leaving landowners without recourse against un- 
reasonable regulations.102 
It is for these reasons that the Court held that “no single 
consideration can supply the exclusive test for determining the 
denominator.”103 In other words, Murr put forth a flexible, ad 
hoc balancing test. However, the Court recognized that the 
inquiry must be guided by some clear factors in order to be 
workable. The Court thus proceeded to amend the Penn Cen- 
tral test to set forth the factors that must be considered in 
determining the denominator in takings analysis.104    Namely, 
[C]ourts must consider . . . [T]he treatment of the land under 
state and local law; the physical characteristics of the land; 
and the prospective value of the regulated land. The en- 
deavor should determine whether reasonable expectations 
about property ownership would lead a landowner to antici- 
pate that his holdings would be treated as one parcel, or, 
instead, as separate  tracts.105 
Stated differently, the denominator test is an objective test 
of whether reasonable expectations about property ownership 
would lead a landowner to anticipate his holdings to be treated 
as one parcel or as separate tracts. The three factors enumer- 
ated above are used to guide the analysis. Using these new 
factors, the Court affirmed the ruling of the state courts and 
found that the regulations at issue did not effect a  taking.106 
 
V 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SBJSA UNDER TAKINGS 
ANALYSIS 
Takings law has the potential to be damning for the viabil- 
ity of any commercial rent regulation proposal, particularly the 
 
102 Id. at 1944–45 (citation omitted) (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 
606, 626–27 (2001)). 
103    Id. at 1945. 
104 See id. at 1945–46. For a discussion of how the Murr test might not have 
made the denominator inquiry clearer at all, see generally Richard A. Epstein, 
Disappointed Expectations: How the Supreme Court Failed to Clean Up Takings 
Law in Murr v. Wisconsin, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 151, 183–89 (2017) (explain- 
ing that Murr “dodged the hard questions latent in applying the ‘parcel-as-a- 
whole’ test”). 
105 Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945. 
106 See id. at 1948–50.  The Court reasoned that the property’s treatment  
under state law made it reasonable to expect that the lots would be treated as a 
single property. Further, the physical characteristics (namely, the contiguous- 
ness) of the lots makes it reasonable to expect that their potential uses might be 
limited. Finally, the restriction on either individual lot is mitigated by the benefits 
of having one large, integrated property. 
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SBJSA. Despite the pessimistic position of proponents of the 
SBJSA that the New York City Council is nothing more than a 
shill for the real estate industry, the argument that commercial 
rent control is unconstitutional (absent just compensation) 
might hold some water. In short, if commercial landlords in 
New York are restricted in the ways in which they can use their 
property under the Act, they will be able to make some compel- 
ling legal claims that the Act constitutes either a categorical, 
per se taking or an ad hoc regulatory taking that requires the 
balancing test laid forth in Penn Central and Murr. 
It is first necessary to evaluate whether the government 
regulation that would be instituted by the SBJSA is more accu- 
rately characterized as a permanent physical invasion or as a 
nonphysical balancing of societal interests. If the SBJSA is 
best characterized as the former, then it will likely constitute a 
categorical, per se taking. If the SBJSA is the latter, then it is 
subject to the ad hoc balancing outlined in Penn Central and its 
progeny. 
 
A. The SBJSA and Categorical Takings 
Although Loretto’s physical taking rule is somewhat nar- 
row, there is an argument to be made that it applies in the 
commercial rent regulation context: when the government 
forces a landlord to allow a tenant to remain at a lower rent 
than the landlord would prefer (or could otherwise get at fair 
market value), it constitutes a per se taking. This argument 
does seem compelling on its face. However, the SBJSA’s funda- 
mental requirements that small commercial tenants have a 
right of renewal and that there exist a more tenant-friendly 
negotiation process do not seem to be the type of physical inva- 
sions that are within the contemplation of Loretto, which dealt 
with a government installation of a wire on the plaintiff’s 
building.107 
Furthermore, even if the SBJSA is a physical invasion by 
the government, it is doubtful that it constitutes a permanent 
physical invasion. Proponents of the bill would likely point out 
that it is irrelevant because, no matter what, the landlord seeks 
to have a tenant in the space. Thus, having a tenant that 
simply pays less rent is not truly a permanent physical inva- 
sion. In other words, regardless of the outcome, there would be 
a tenant in that space.  Further, the SBJSA permits the  land- 
 
107 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421–22 
(1982). 
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lord to get a new tenant if there is a bona-fide offer after negoti- 
ations with the previous tenant collapse.108 This latter point 
tilts in favor of the argument that even if there is an invasion, it 
is not a permanent one. 
On the other hand, opponents of the bill might suggest that 
landlords should not be forced to offer their space to tenants 
when they no longer find it economically viable. The reality is 
that even previous tenants can stay in place indefinitely. Op- 
ponents of the SBJSA will likely assert that to require landlords 
to do so—that is, to require them to continue allowing an unde- 
sired tenant who can indefinitely renew the lease to occupy the 
space—is precisely the type of permanent physical invasion 
that is within the contemplation of Loretto. To analogize the 
situation to Loretto, one wire kept on a landlord’s building by 
the government and another wire kept on the building by the 
landlord are two very different things, even if they appear to be 
the same. 
Although the latter argument is compelling, ultimately it 
does not seem as if the physical presence of a particular com- 
mercial tenant is the harm. Rather, the harm alleged is solely 
economic: the inability of the landlord to collect as high a rent 
on the property as desired. In other words, opponents of the 
SBJSA believe that, under the Act, landlords suffer a nonphysi- 
cal taking that renders them unable to fully use their property 
to seek higher, market rate rents on commercial space. Such 
an argument must be evaluated under the Penn Central and 
Murr line of cases. 
 
B. Ad Hoc Regulatory Takings and the SBJSA 
 
If the SBJSA is merely adjusting the benefits and burdens 
of economic life to promote the common good, rather than im- 
posing a permanent physical invasion on property, then it is 
subject to the ad hoc balancing and denominator analysis set 
forth in Penn Central and Murr.109 As suggested above, the 
denominator question can have an enormous—indeed, most 
likely a dispositive—effect on whether the Act constitutes a 
taking. 
At the outset, it is worth noting that commercial 
storefronts in New York City can either be owned as (1) free- 
standing commercial buildings, (2) as separate, individual par- 
 
108 See Creating a Small Business Lease Program, supra note 51. 
109 See supra Part III. 
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cels that happen to be part of a larger building,110 or (3) as part 
of a unified, mixed-use parcel that includes both residential 
and commercial space under a single owner.111 As the follow- 
ing subsections explain, the first two will be treated similarly 
when it comes to denominator analysis, but the latter must be 
treated differently. 
 
1. Freestanding Commercial Buildings and Commercial 
Spaces Owned Separately in Mixed-Use Buildings 
In addition to freestanding commercial buildings, New 
York is home to innumerable mixed-use residential-commer- 
cial structures that are spliced up, with the commercial spaces 
and residential spaces under separate ownership.112 In such a 
situation, there is no complicated denominator problem impli- 
cated by the SBJSA. In other words, there is no ambiguity in 
what the parcel as a whole is; there is no way to conceptually 
sever one portion of the property from the other. Thus, in 
evaluating whether the SBJSA would constitute a regulatory 
taking when applied to small businesses located on these types 
of properties, it is only necessary to apply the Penn Central 
analysis to the value of the commercial space. 
If the SBJSA were to pass in City Council, owners of these 
types of properties would have a very compelling argument that 
the Act constitutes a taking under the Penn Central analysis. 
As evidenced by the astronomically higher rents collected by 
landlords after the leases of small business expire (often tens of 
times higher), it is clear that landlords’ “investment-backed 
expectations”113 are dramatically curtailed if they are forbidden 
from attracting market rents. For instance, a landlord who is 
able to attract a market rent ten times higher than that paid by 
a current, small business tenant would be able to show that 
the SBJSA diminishes the value of the property by 90%. 
Although proponents of the SBJSA may argue that the 
benefit to society of ensuring that small businesses can stay in 
their spaces outweighs this cost, the reality is that the SBJSA 
does not truly guarantee that they will be able to stay. Rather, 
it merely gives them the right of renewal and the ability to go to 
 
110 One such example is a ground-floor commercial condominium in a large, 
mixed-use building in which the residential condominiums above are owned sep- 
arately from the commercial condominium below. 
111 See SPECIAL INITIATIVE FOR REBUILDING AND RESILIENCY, N.Y.C., A STRONGER, 
MORE RESILIENT NEW YORK ch. 4 at 70–71 [hereinafter REBUILDING AND RESILIENCY]. 
112    See id. 
113  Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
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arbitration with their landlord.114 In light of this, it seems 
likely that owners of freestanding commercial spaces and own- 
ers of commercial spaces that are owned separately from the 
mixed-use structures in which they are housed will be able to 
show that the SBJSA constitutes a taking, almost entirely di- 
minishing the market value of their property. This alone is 
enough to make the SBJSA prohibitively expensive because it 
is not feasible to compensate the landlords for this loss. 
 
2. Commercial Spaces in Mixed-Use Structures Under 
Unified Ownership 
Mixed-use structures, containing both commercial and 
residential spaces, can be—and commonly are—part of a build- 
ing under unified ownership.115 These types of properties pre- 
sent an altogether different inquiry, reintroducing the need for 
denominator analysis. 
Opponents of the SBJSA who own mixed-use buildings, 
housing both commercial and residential spaces, will likely ar- 
gue that the appropriate denominator here is the commercial 
space alone, rather than the commercial space plus the various 
residential units above. This is because if the denominator is 
merely the commercial space, they will be able to show almost 
complete diminution in value, as with the types of property in 
subsection one above. That is, if we are concerned with the 
diminution in value only of the commercial space whose use is 
severely restricted by the SBJSA, then it seems likely that the 
SBJSA would constitute a taking. On the other hand, if the 
denominator in this takings analysis is the value of the com- 
mercial space in addition to the various (very expensive) resi- 
dences above it in the mixed-use building, then the diminution 
will be comparatively small. Stated more clearly, the landlord’s 
inability to realize the maximal value that the market can get 
for a commercial space will be deemed to have less of an impact 
in evaluating whether a taking has occurred. If the diminution 
is comparatively small, then it is almost certain that the SBJSA 
will not constitute a taking under the Penn Central test. 
It is difficult to see why this situation is any different from 
Penn Central’s failed argument to have the court conceptually 
sever its air rights from the value of the parcel as a whole. The 
rejection of conceptual severance set forth in Penn Central 
seems to guarantee that the diminution in value under the 
 
114 See supra subpart III.B. 
115 See REBUILDING AND RESILIENCY, supra note 111. 
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SBJSA would be considered relative to both the commercial 
and residential space together. In other words, to say that 
commercial space in a mixed-use building should be consid- 
ered separately from residential space in the same building 
seems very much akin to the argument that Grand Central’s 
airspace should be considered separately from the building it- 
self—an argument that the Court squarely rejected. Thus, it 
does not seem like the SBJSA would constitute a regulatory 
taking for owners of mixed-use buildings that house both com- 
mercial and residential units. 
However, recognizing this, any rational landlord in a world 
in which the SBJSA passed would simply attempt to restruc- 
ture the building ownership such that the commercial and resi- 
dential space were entirely separate, rather than one parcel.116 
It is in this situation that the Murr test becomes relevant. In 
other words, a landlord who owns two separate parcels—com- 
mercial and residential—housed in one building will argue that 
they should be treated as separate. This is precisely like the 
Murrs’ argument that their adjacent parcels should be treated 
as separate.117 In this instance, the parcels are simply verti- 
cally rather than horizontally contiguous pieces of property. 
If the parcels are treated separately, then the SBJSA would 
diminish the value of the commercial space enough that it 
would likely constitute a taking. Per Murr, then, one critical 
question in such a situation arises: Would a landlord’s reason- 
able expectations about property ownership lead the land- 
owner to anticipate the commercial and residential spaces in a 
mixed-use building to be treated as one parcel or as separate 
tracts? If it is the former, the SBJSA will likely not constitute a 
taking; if it is the latter, then it almost certainly will. 
To evaluate this denominator problem, it is necessary to 
use the factors laid out in Murr.118 Turning first to the treat- 
ment of the land under state and local law, proponents of the 
bill will likely succeed in pointing out that ownership of com- 
mercial and residential space in a single building would rea- 
sonably lead the owner to expect these components to be 
treated as one. This somewhat blends into the second factor: 
the physical characteristics of the land. In this scenario, we 
are dealing with a single building that has simply been subdi- 
vided  into  different  pieces.  The  commercial  and residential 
 
116 For instance, by turning the building into a condominium in which the 
commercial and residential units are owned as separate parcels unto themselves. 
117 See supra subpart III.C. 
118 See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct 1933, 1944–45 (2017). 
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portions are vertically contiguous to one another—they are lit- 
erally housed under one roof and owned by the same person, 
thus making it even more reasonable to expect them to be 
treated as one than the adjacent tracts in Murr. Turning finally 
to the prospective value of the regulated land, this factor seems 
to lean towards viewing them as one parcel. When the com- 
mercial and residential components are considered as one par- 
cel, their combined value would be worth significantly more 
than each parcel separately, and any diminution in the value of 
the commercial space would not affect the value of the residen- 
tial space.119 Indeed, they would exhibit the same “comple- 
mentarity” as the tracts in  Murr.120 
In summary, it can be said that a landowner who owns 
both the commercial and residential portions of a mixed-use 
structure would reasonably expect the two parts to be treated 
as one tract. The result is somewhat paradoxical: the mere fact 
that separate commercial and residential components of one 
building happen to be owned by the same person will likely 
mean that the regulation of the commercial space does not 
result in a taking. On the other hand, it would constitute a 
taking if the commercial space and residential space were 
owned by separate individuals. Nonetheless, this seems to be 
the result that current takings law compels under Murr. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The decline in small businesses is one of the most signifi- 
cant and important challenges that the city faces in the coming 
years. After some (albeit unfinished) success in addressing the 
housing affordability crisis in the city during its first term, the 
de Blasio administration should turn its focus to the equally 
precarious position of the city’s small businesses. Although it 
is difficult to imagine a better impetus for action than the en- 
dangerment of thousands of New Yorkers’ livelihoods, stronger 
commercial rental protections also serve the interests of the 
community more generally. This appears to be a fact that is 
increasingly recognized in City  Council.121 
In order to combat this, some City Council legislators have 
proposed the SBJSA. However, the bill has struggled to get to 
the floor of City Council for a vote despite enjoying support 
from most councilmembers. This failure is largely because of 
opponents’ claims that the Act, without compensating    land- 
 
119 See id. at 1948. 
120 See id. at 1949. 
121 See Lynch, supra note 55. 
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lords for the large diminution in value of their property, consti- 
tutes an unconstitutional regulatory taking. 
In light of the current state of regulatory takings law, this 
argument likely holds true for commercial parcels that are free- 
standing or under different ownership from the mixed-use 
structures in which they are located; however, it is likely that 
the SBJSA does not constitute a regulatory taking when com- 
mercial and residential portions of a mixed-use building are 
under the same ownership. 
Although the SBJSA might not amount to a regulatory tak- 
ing when applied to every commercial space in New York, its 
application to even some of them would likely make it prohibi- 
tively costly. Thus, to address the rising affordability crisis for 
New York’s small businesses, the city should instead find alter- 
native solutions that do not involve forms of commercial rent 
control. This could mean providing more subsidies to small 
business owners directly, or it could mean providing tax and 
other incentives to landlords to encourage rentals to small 
businesses and discourage maintaining empty storefronts in 
the city. This should provide important guidance to both New 
York and other cities that are concerned with the state of small 
businesses within their boundaries. 
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